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THE NEW REGIONALISM: TRADE
LIBERALIZATION OR INSURANCE?
ABSTRACT
Several of the recently negotiated regional trade agreements (Canada-U.S., NAFFA, E.C.-
Hungary/Poland/Czeck and Slovak Republics) contain significantly fewer concessions by the large
countries to smaller countries than vice versa. Yet, it is small countries that have sought them
and see themselves as the main beneficiaries. In this paper we attempt to resolve this seeming
paradox by interpreting such agreements as insurance arrangements for smaller countries, which
partially protect them against the consequences of a global trade war. What they offer to the
large countries in retwn is largely non-trade benefits (such as restraints on domestic policies in
the smaller countries, firmer intellectual property protection, firmer guarantees of royalty
arrangements affecting resources on state-owned lands).
When evaluated alongside the regional trade arrangements of the l960s (such as the E.C.),
these agreements may appear to produce little or no benefit relative to the status quo for smaller
countries; but when evaluated relative to a post-retaliation tariff equilibrium, the value of these
agreements to small countries is large because they help preserve existing access to larger foreign
markets. There is little incentive for large countries to negotiate such arrangements without side
payments of the non-trade variety, because these agreements constrain their ability to play
strategically against smaller neighbouring countries (who are still important trade partners) in a
trade war. Such regional agreements compared across constrained and unconstrained Nash
outcomes will typically be welfare worsening for large countries, and side payments are needed
for the agreements to proceed.
We compute post-retaliation Nash tariffs by region under various regional and other trade
arrangements using a calibrated numerical general equilibrium model of world trade, with
aggregates of importables and exportables for the key trading areas (U.S., E.C., Japan, Canada,
Mexico, Other Western Europe, Rest-of-the-World). Regional agreements constrain strategic
behaviour within each trading area, and (at least in Customs Union case) enhance it outside the
bloc. Results confirm the intuition that without side payments large-small country regional
agreements will not occur, and provide insights on other related issues such as sequential bloc
formation (Mexico to follow Canada), and simultaneous bloc formation (NAFTA and E.C.-
EFTA).
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and NBER1 Introduction
The new regionalism that has entered global trade arrangements in the last few years
(Canada-U.S.. NAFTA, E.C. accession agreements with Eastern European countries),
has receivedconsiderableattention in both academic and popular literaure.1 Our
point of departure in this paper is in characterizingmuchof this new regionalism as
(in effect) one-sided, in contrast to more conventional reciprodty-based Free Trade
or Customs Union agreements widely analyzed in theoretical literature. We then
suggest that without side payments these agreements would likely never have been
negotiated.
We argue that, in the main, these new regional arrangements are the outcome
of smaller countries with little negotiating power seeking safe-haven trade arrange-
ments with larger countries, primarily so as to make their access to large markets
more secure. In the resulting agreements. larger countries have been able to both
extract a price for their participation, largely in the form of non-trade concessions, as
well as enhance their power in bloc-wide negotiation. As such. we argue that these
agreements should be seen as insurance arrangements with premia paid by smaller
countries to large countries) as much as conventional trade liberalization.
To develop these arguments. we use a general equilibrium trade model of tariff
'See the two recent editedresearchvolumes on thenewregionalism from the World Bank (Dc
Melo and Panagariya(1993)) and GATT (Anderson and Blackhurst (1993)). There is also substantial
discussion of it.inrecent issues of the trade policy journal The Word Economy: see Bhagwati (1992).
Jackson (1993). Sapir (1993), Winters (1992). and the January 1992 symposturn on model-based
evaluations of NAFTA.retaliation, and use numerical simulation methods to evaluate some of the recent
regional agreements in this light. For this purpose, we compute post-retaliation Nash
outcomes in global tariff games under the various restraints on retaliation that these
agreements imply. In the presence of a Free Trade Area, members maintain zero
barriers to each other even in a global trade war, but they each retaliate separately
against non-members. In the presence of a Customs i..nion. retaliation against third
countries takes place via a common external tariff used jointly by all members of the
union.
Our model incorporates seven regions (United States, Canada, Mexico, Japan.
the Eu.ropean Cornmuxiity, Other Western Europe, and a residual Rest-of-the-World)
allowing us to capture some of the key regional trading features of the current global
economy, and is calibrated to 1986inter-countrytrade flow data, and to literature-
based trade elasticities. Because of the large dimensionalities involved incorriputing
Nash equilibria in the presence of multiple goods and countries.2 we limit ourselves
to formulations with two goods (importables, exportables) for each country-.--with
the importables being treated as qualitatively different across sources ofsupply (by
exporting country).
We first use our model to evaluate both the effects of, and the country incentives
to participate in a Canada-U.S. agreement. We compute non-cooperative Nash tariff
equilibria in the global economy with and without a Canada-U.S.agreement, and
with and without side payments. Our resultssuggest that for the U.S., it does not
pay to conclude a regional agreement with Canada if no side payments are allowed.
7See the discussion in ilarniltonand Whalley(1983).
2Even in the case of the formation of a. Customs Union. where there is more leverage
for the U.S. in a tariff war with the E.C. and RO\\", losing the opportunity to play
strategically against Canada more than offsets this source of gain. On the other hand,
since Canada benefits substantially from preferential duty-free access to U.S. markets
in a bloc-wide rather than a country-wide trade war, the side payment that the U.S.
can demand of Canada more than compensates for such losses. Thus, in a trade war
between blocs with side payments within blocs, the U.S. is better off participating in
a regional agreement than not. Under this scenario, both large and small countries
see it as in their interests to form insurance-based regional trade blocs, even if the
barrier changes relative to the pre-trade war status quo are small.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 examines recent regional trade
agreements and puts forward our main arguments. Section 3 describes a numerical
general equilibrium model of tariff retaliation and bargaining, and Section 4 describes
the data and parameters used to calibrate the model. Section 5 presents results of
numerical simulations. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Interpreting recent regional trade agreements
Represented. among others, by the 1988 Canada.U.S. Agreement, the NAFTA text.
new E.C.-EFTA arrangements. E.C. association agreements with Hungary. Poland.
and the Czech and Slovak republics, and proposed arrangements in the Pacific (PA PTA,
AFTA and others), most recent regional trade agreements contrast with older regional
arrangements such as the Treaty of Rome and EFTA in country coverage and un-
3denying objectives.3 Perhaps the most striking feature of the recent regionalism is
that seemingly small countries with little negotiating power have initiated trade ne-
gotiations with larger countries and successfully concluded them. This has been, in
large part, because their concern has primarily been security of access to their largest
markets, rather than a desire to only generate improvements in access through con-
ventional reciprocal exchange of trade concessions.4 Thus, the large countries have
had substantially more negotiating power than the smaller countries, and have been
able to extract a payment for insurance through trade and non-trade concessions
made by the smaller countries; and the smaller countries have been willing to pay the
required insurance premium.
Any cursory examination of the Canada-U.S. or NAFTA agreements reveals that
the substantial majority of the concessions are by the smaller acceding country (see
Table I). These indude restraints on their domestic policies affecting royalty. pricing.
and security of supply arrangements, as well as explicit trade concessions.5 Along with
3The details of these agreements are discussed in a number of recent pieces in the policy oriented
literature.TheCanada-U.S. agreements and NAFTA are discussed in Whalley (1993) and Hufbauer
and Schott(1992): E.C.agreementsare discussed inWin ters (199.3a,b);andagreements in the Pacific
are summathed in Bollard andMayes (1992).
4TheToronto paper The GlobeandMail, April 10, 1990. P. 81, reported President Salinas of
Mexico as saying at an early stage of the NAFTA negotiating process "What we want is closer
commercial ties with Canada and the United States, especially in a world in which big regional
markets are being created. We don't want to be left out of any of those regional markets, especially
not out of the Canadian and American mar kets.
5The word "concession" here is used in a negotiating sense. and covers policy and other changes
4Table 1: Asymmetric Concessions in Recent Regional Agreements
1. U.S.-CANADA AGREEMENT
• Phased bilateral tariff slirrünation over10 years
•New bilateraldispute settlement procedures
Asymmetric concessions
(i) exclusions (textiles/apparel; shipping 1
(ii) security of supply provisions in energr
(iii) domestic policy restraints over energr pricing
(iv) limits on investment ucreerutig
(v) changes in patent/intellectual property arrangements (not formally in agreement)
(vi) changes in domestic arrangements in wines and spirit..
2. NAFTA
• Phased trilateral tariff elimination otcr 15 years
• Dispute settlement procedures as in U.S.-Cartad.a Agreement
Asymmetric concessions
(i) asymmetric liberalization in agriculture (corn/beans in Mexico: little in U.S./Canada)
(ii) domestic policy restraints on energy pricing in Mexico
(iii) limits on investment screening
(iv) sugar protection in Mex,co raisedto matchU.S. levels
(v) Mexico adoptsauto contentrules along lines of U.S-Can-ada Agreement (withrevised nuioberul
(vi)Mexico financesborder environrneriLai clean up (notformally inagrrent)
(vii) Mexico strengthens intellectual property protection (not formally in agreement)
3. E.C./HUNGARY-POLAND-CZECII AND SLOVAK REPIJ8LICS
• Liberalization to E.C. exports and investment in return for phased reciprocal eliminaijon of E.C. duties in
"sensitive" product.
Asymmetric concessions
(i) protection for E.C. investment in Hungary Poland, and Czech and Slovak Republics
(ii) guarantees of competition policy/antitrust reform in Hungary. PoLand. and Czech and Slovak Republics
5formal concessions as part of these agreements, domestic policy changes sought by
the larger country have also occurred simultaneously with the negotiations and, while
not being part of an ecplicit treaty arrangement, become implicitly so.6 That recent
regional trade agreements are largely one-sided in their outcome has been noted by a
number of authors;7 while we claim no novelty for this observation, it is nonetheless
one that is not often heard in policy debates on their merits or effects.
Thus, Canada's desire to avoid being '1sideswiped" by U.S. trade actions aimed
at other countries was a key factor behind their request for a bilateral negotiation
in 1985,8 a concern which subsequently translated into requests for special treatment
under U.S. trade remedy laws. Mexico's 1990 request for a bilateral negotiation with
the U.S. (subsequently trilateralized to the NAFTA negotiation) was motivated, in
part, by similar concerns, although the desire of Mexican policy makers to use trade
agreements as a way of locking in domestic policy reform was also important. The
subsequent interest in acceding to NAFTA expressed by Chile, Colombia. Costa Rica,
whichmaybenefitdomestic consumers as well as foreigners.
6Thesehaveincluded changes in patent protection for foreign pharmaceuticals inCanada,and
commitmentsof funds to environmental programmesinMedco.
TSee the discussion of the Canada-U.S. agreements and NAFTA in Whallev(1993), comments
in similar vein.about the NAFTA outcome in Wonnacott (1993), and discussion of E.C.accession
agreemers for the Eastern European countries in Winters (1993b).
5See theReport oftbeMacDonald Commission; theFederal Government body in Canada that
initially recommended Canada negotiateabilateral trade agreement with theU.S. (Canada,Royal
Commissiononthe Economic Union and Development. Prcpects for Canada (1985)).
6New Zealand, Venezuela, and others, reflects similar insurance-driven objectives for
all these countries.
The objectives of the EFTA countries, Eastern European countries. Turkey, North
African countries, and others, in seeking negotiations with the European Comm unity
have also been similar; achieving safe-haven agreements with their largest trading
partners with, in these cases, also containment and eventual removal of explicit sec-
toral protection severely affecting key export industries (garments, footwear, steel,
and agriculture). While agreements in Asia perhaps have fewer of these elements
(the1985 Australia-NewZealand Agreement is of theoldertype), they cannonethe-
less befound;as, for instance, in the1987Japan-ASEAN arrangement.9
Theresultingimbalance of concessions is apparent in the outcomes in each case. In
theCanada-U.S.case, tariffs weresolow before theagreementthat,savein apparel,
petrochemicals and a few other areas, their bilateral elimination meant little.'0 But in
apparel, a remaining tariff quota restrains entry to U.S. markets for Canadian produc-
ers at trade levels above the pre-agreernent situation; in transportation, the restrictive
Jones Act in the U.S. is preserved: in energy, differential domestic/foreign pricing in
Canada is outlawed and security of supply provisions granted to U .S. purchases of
energy products; in investment, screening procedures are relaxed in Canada: and
(although not in the agreement, but occurring simultaneously) signicant Canadian
9See Lbediscussionof this in Hamilton and Whalley (forthcoming).
'0As noted byWhaiiey(1903) p. 355. before the Agreement cameintoforce. the averagetariffon
Canadianexports to the U.S.was approximately1%, and nearly8Oof Canadian trade withthe
U.S. was already duty free.
7changes were made in patent protection, including patents affecting foreign pharrna-
ceuticals.
In the case of NAFTA, tariff elimination is a.syrnmetric because of higher initial
levels in Mexico;'1 Mexico liberalizes substantially in corn and beans with no signif-
icant U.S. or Canadian agricultural liberalization, raises sugar protection to match
U.S. levels, eliminates the Mexican auto decree, adopts auto content provisions as in
the Canada-U.S. Agreement, agrees to and partially finances environmental clean-up,
and also commits not to use differential domestic/export pricing ofenergy. In the E. C.
accession agreements with Eastern Europe, guarantees of competition/anti-trust pOl-
icy reform in acceding countries appear, along with protection for direct E.C. foreign
investment and liberalization to E.C. products in return for only phased reciprocal
elimination by the E.C. in "sensitive" products.'2
This view of recent regionalism as small country insurance issurprisingly absent
from recent professional literature on its effects andconsequences. While circumspect
as to the merits of new regional arrangements in the current global economy, such
literature has not as yet focussed centrally on the nature of theseagreements: asking
instead whether more conventional regionalarrangements are necessarily bad since
losses from higher post-retaliation barriers between blocs are offsetby gains from freer
trade within larger blocs (Krugman (1991)); or whether a drift towardsregional blocs
"Weintraub (1991) reports an average Mexican tariff of 9%: Hart(1991) puts trade weighted
Mexican tariffs at 8%. This is in contrast to GATT bound Mexican tariffs of50%, and average
Mexican tariffs before 1985 (the start of the current liberalizationprogramme) of around 4.5%.
'2See Winters (1993b) p. 122.
8is Inevitable in the global system since in a dynamic game with enforced penalties for
deviation from multilateral rules, multilateral co-operation can reassert itself (Bag-
well and Staiger (1992)). Viewed as insurance driven, the incentives for the larger
countries to join such negotiations become clearer; namely, to take advantage of an
opportunity to deal with non-trade issues with the smaller country; to elevate, even
if only incrementally, their bargaining power with other large countries; and to use
the threat of proceeding to regional arrangements to pressure recalcitrant multilateral
negotiating partners of similar size.
Thus our contention is that the large country-small country trade arrangements
which dominate the new regionalism have to be seen as insurance-based agreements
with side payments, not as reciprocity-driven, and that the risks of such trade wars
occurring in large part drive the formation of blocs. Under these arrangements,
insurance is granted to small countries, while premia are paid to large countries in the
form of concessions of the non-trade variety. These safe-haven agreements affect the
large country's bargaining power with other large countries, reducing it in the case of a
Free Trade Area, enhancing it in the case of a Customs Union; in both cases, the larger
countries forgo the opportunity to play strategically against smaller countries)4 Small
13Then Senator Bentzen, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, is quoted by Dymond
(1989) in the debate on the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area as saying "The F1'AwithCanada means
that the United States can say in Geneva '11 you won't work with us to open up world trade, then
we can negotiate trade agreements with other countries on a bilateral basis and those countries will
have the advantage of it and you won't be sharing in it.
14Tbus, evaluated relative to an unconstrained trade war outcome, the net effect of the formaton
of a Free Trade Area is to raise global welfare, whereas the global welfare effect of a Customs Union
9countries obtain protected and preferential access to the larger country's market,'5
and, in the Customs Union case, see their retaliatory power against third countries
increased. For this protection, large countries can exact payments from the smaller
countries participating in these arrangements.'6
3 A general equilibrium trade model of tariff re-
taliation with and without regionalarrange-
ments
We analyze the insurance basis for new regional arrangements using an enlargedver-
sion of the Nash tariff retaliatory international trade structure first used by Johnson
(1954), and Gorman (1957), and subsequently expanded in Hamilton and Wha]lev
(1983), Markusen and Wigle (1989), Kennan and Riezman (1990). and elsewhere.
Here we compute Nash equilibria in tariff rates in higher dimensionalspace than pre-
vious literature, with a more complex analytical structure and without the restriction
to constant-elasticity excess demand forms used in some of the earlier literature.
is ambiguous. See Kennan and Rie2man (19g0).
In the eventof a trade war,trade between blocs willfall,but intra-bloc trade will rise.
HAnd if large countries calculate that, with these sidepayments, the formation of regional blocs
is to their advantage, multilateral arrangements may become less attractive tolarge countries than a
two-tier system of multilateral-type rules only among the larger countri1 with safe-havenregional
arrangements with smaller satellites.
10In our model, regional trade arrangements represent constraints on retaliation.
The introduction of such constraints produces gains or losses for the countries in-
volved relative to an unconstrained trade war.'7 Thus, compensation in the form of
other non-trade concessions may be required for an agreement to proceed. To obtain
estimates of the side payments involved, we use a two-stage game structure as de-
scribed in Riezman (1985). In the first stage of the game, countries form coalitions:
in the second stage of the game, Nash tariffs are determined. We extend Riezman's
framework, however, by allowing for side payments within coalitions1 and by intro-
ducing uncertainty in the first-stage bargaining game.
3.1 Technology and preferences
Our model is a simplified version of the older numerical competitive international
trade models which incorporate internationally differentiated products (often referred
to as "Armington" trade models),'8 but here only one good is produced in each region.
This implies that, if primary factors are assumed to be internationally immobile, we
can represent production as fixed supply. This specification, in effect, amounts to
a pure exchange economy, where trade offer curves are fully determined by endow-
"The risk to smallercountrieswhich underlies their search for regional trade agreements is in
reality ooe that their largest trading partner (U.S. for Canada) may turn protectionist, as much as the
outbreak of a full global trade war. Such contingency could be captured through a first-step optimal
tariff calculation for the Larger partner. Numerical results would change, but the interpretation of
regional agreernent.s as insurance arrangements could still apply.
'8As in Whalley (1985) or, more recently, in Nguyen, Perroni and Wigle (1991)
11ments and preferences. A fixed supply 'ofa single good is produced in each region
(j= 1,...,R), but consumers in region jdemandboth domestic output and anag-
gregate of imports from all other regions. Thus, the supply of exportables by each
region is perfectly inelastic, although by an appropriate setting of elasticities in de-
mand functions similar trade responses to those from models with less-than-perfectly
inelastic supply responses can be generated.'9
We use an LES representation of preferences, so that for region j's representative
consumer the utility function can be written as




where D and A' represent respectively final demands for domestic output and foran
import aggregate. The b's are share parameters and oisthe elasticity of substitution
between domestic production and the import aggregate. Li and Aare LES shift
parameters which can be interpreted as subsistence levels.
Consumption of the import composite A is a CES aggregation of imports, M,
from all regions i=1,..,R(otherthan region j): --
M,'_,M 1f) =(a) (.i7) ' .Vj, (2)
where the as are share parameters, and p is the elasticity of substitution inregion
jamongimports from different origins.
This use of LES preferences allows us to set both income andprice elasticities
of demands for imports at values other than unity. Theseutility functions also do
'9Our choice of a single good model structure is principally dictated by thesparsit,vofavailable
empirical estimates of income and price elasticities for trade flows disaggregated by producttype.
12not yield constant-elasticity excess demand functions, for which computation of Nash
tariffs is simplified since optimal strategies by countries are independent of responses
(as noted by Johnson (1954) and Gorman (1957)).
3.2 Market equilibrium (for given tariffs)
Given tariff rates in each region, we first describe a competitive equilibrium for this
structure, and then subsequently discuss the computation of Nash equilibria. p
denotes the net-of-tariff price of region j's goods (i.e., the domestic price in region
j),t isthe ad va!orem tariff rate on imports from region i by region j,andY' is
disposable income in region j.Thelatter is equal to the sum of the value of output
and tariff revenues:
Y)=pJ+tp,M, Vj. (3)






+ b (p) 1_c)](p')3'
where p is the gross-of-tariff price of region j's import aggregate:
={ a1(1+t)pI1'}
*Vj. (5)
Exportsupply for region jisthen
=— D',Yj. (6)
Given domestic demand for the import aggregate in region j.
= PD PA
.i. v,. (7)
(ps)+ b (J)IcJ] ()))




Total demand for region i's exports is then given by
=M,Vz. (9)
Internationalmarkets clearing requires equality betveen export supplies from each
region and total import demands for the product in all other regions:
X' =It'11,Vi. (10)
An equilibrium for this model is thus given by values p's, p4, Yi, D'. A', X, Vj,
M13, Vi j,andM, Vi, which satisfy equations (3) to (10).
3.3 Computation of Nash tariff equilibria
Computation of Nash tariff equilibria was first discussed by Johnson (1954), "-ho
noted that in the case where net trade functions are of constant elasticity form.
optimal tariff rates by one country are independent of any retaliation by the other
country, making computation of Nash equilibria trivial. \Vith multiple countries
and imperfect substitution among sources of imports, thesesimplifying features of
the Johnson formulation no longer hold. With more than tworegions, retaliation
can take place against different regions at different levels. And using nested LES
functional forms implies that excess demand functions need not be restrictedto the
constant-elasticity form.
14We compute Nash tariff equilibria by sequentially computing optimal tariff rates
for each region, holding the other regions' tariff rates constant in each calculation.2°
All regions are assumed to play strategically in their tariff setting, with the exception
of the ROW, who offers no strategic response. This assumption reflects the observa-
tion that trade policies in a large number of countries belonging to the ROW bloc
are in reality not coordinated in any meaningful way, implying that strategic power
of each individual country in the ROW is negligible.21
In the central-case version of our model, the objective of the tariff-setting authority
in each region is welfare maximization for its representative consumer. For Customs
Unions, the tariff setting authority is assumed to maximize a linear combination of
the welfare levels of the representative consumers of its cember countries, where the
weights are proportional to benchmark GNP levels22 No side payments are made at
this stage of our calculations.
We iterate through a sequence of calculations, moving across regions until we
achieve convergence. Successful application of this approach relies heavily on the
stability of such equilibria (which in turn depends on the monotonicity and slope
20We use the GAMS/MINOS (Generalized AlgebraicModeling System) numericaloptimization
software (Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus (1988)).
21This implication is perhaps a little strong, as the ROW includ a number of larger economies
such as China, India and Branil, although their individual shares in total world trade are small.
"Although this appears to be a heuristically appealing rule, it has been shown that under certain
conditons itmaybe optimal for smaller countries to fully delegate tariff setting to larger countries
when forming a Customs Union, i.e., to have a zero weight in the objective of the tariff-setting
authority. See Gatsios and Karp (1991).
15of reaction functions). But, as Hamilton and \Vhalley (1983) found earlier in lower
dimensional space, for the class of functional forms we use here (CES, lIES), this
procedure works well in practice. We also note that this computational procedure
does not check for the presence of multiple Nash equilibria.23
In those cases where two or more regions form a Free Trade Area or a Customs
Union, computation of Nash equilibria takes place in the presence of additional con-
straints on each region's optimization problem. Regions within a Free Trade Area
have tariffs on bilateral trade frozen at zero. For Customs Unions we require that
external barriers be identical for all members of the union, in addition to freezing bi-
lateral tariffs.24 We also require that import levies set by all other regions be uniform
across exports originating from all members.25
Post-retaliation Nash tariffs are directly related to import demand elasticities
(and hence also to export supply elasticities). with tariff levels increasing sharply as
23The reaction functions generated by our numerical mode! for the chosen parameterizatjonare
monotonic, but as Johnson (1954) noted forty years ago, multiple equilibria in tariff games can occur
even with monotonic reaction functions. We have, however, repeated our solution procedure using
different starting points, and never detected such an occurrence
24Tbis is a somewhat restrictive form of Customs Union. A looserarrangement would be one
where the Custom Union plays strategically as a single bloc by coordinating its individual members'
policies, but no constraixite are placed on its external tariffs and on other cou.ntries' external tariffs.
We assume that the R.t of' the World, which does not set its tariffsstrategically, also conforms
to this rule. We assume the common tariff rate levied by the ROW on its imports from the Customs
Union to be equal to the lowest tariff rate on imports from any member of the Customs Unionin
the initial equilibrium.
16import demand elasticities approach unity (in absolute value). With the Arrnington
treatment in preferences, two levels of substitution are involved: one between imports
as a composite and domestically produced goods (which in our model is determined
by J),andthe other between imports of different origin (which in our model is
determined by p2).Thesetwo separate substitution elasticities jointly determine
import demand elasticities by import type within regions; and, at the same time.
export supply elasticities in all regions.
3.4 Bargaining and side payments
To help assess the implications of tariff retaliation for trade bloc formation and to
explore the role of side payments between members of a regional arrangement, we also
embed the non-cooperative equilibrium structure described in previous sections within
a model of cooperative bargaining under uncertainty. Since no markets in state-
contingent claims exist and regions cannot provide each other with full insurance,26
trade agreements accompanied by side payments can provide a way of making possible
inter-country trades across states of the world. Thus. to assess the viability of a
given prospective trade agreement. we search for vectors of state-independent, inter-
regional lump-sum transfers which, in combination with the agreement itself. produce
an expected utility gain for all regions participating in the agreement (i.e.. a Pareto
improvement). Since these transfers have an effect both on trade flows and on non-
cooperative tariff equilibria, they must be computed simultaneously with all the other
variables in the model.
261n our modet specification, we explicitly assume that such markets do not exist
17For simplicity, we consider two possible states of the world: one in which regions
do not engage in strategic tariff setting, N ("No Trade Wars"), andonewhere a non.
cooperative Nash outcome prevails, W ("Trade Wars"). The representative consumer
in region jattachessubjective probabilities,and irk, (irk + ir,1), to each of
these states. These are taken as given and hence independent of the formation or
otherwise of regional trade arrangements.
We represent consumer preferences over these states of the world by means of a lin-
early homogeneous representation of a Constant-Coefficient-of-Relative- Risk-Aversion
(CCRRA) expected utility function.27 This takes the form
EU(U,U)= ['(u)' Vj, (11)
where (j and (.14, .re utility levels of region jinstates N and W, and pi is region
i's coecient of relative risk aversion. Thus, when two or more regionsagree to
form a Free Trade Area or a Customs TJnion, expected payoffs can be computed by
comparing equilibrium expected utility levels with and without the agreement.
We will denote by Capositive or negative transfer from region i to region j.
whereE, C=0.Disposable income in region j.Y,is then equal to the sum of
the value of output, tariff revenues and total transfers to and from otherregions:
Vj. (12)
If a Pareto improvement for all member regions through acompensation scheme is
possible, the solution will typically not be unique: there will existmany configurations
of transfers that support a Pareto improvement for theparticipating regions, each
2?Thus. expectedutilityis linear in the vector of utility eveL.s in the twostates of the world.
18corresponding to a different distribution of the expected surplus from t.he agreement
among these regions. The vectors of transfers that support Pareto improvements form
the bargaining set of a cooperative game.28 Given the above, we can use a cooperative
game solution concept (such as the Nash bargaining solution29) to explicitly determine
equilibrium transfers supporting a given trade arrangement.
4 Data and calibration
Our model incorporates seven regions: United States. Canada, Mexico, Japan. the
European Community, Other Western Europe (OWE), and a residual Rest-of-the-
World (ROW). A number of data sources are used in model calibration, and elasticities
chosen based on literature estimates.
4.1 Production, trade and protection
The 1986 data set we use is taken from Nguyen. Perroni and Wigle (1993). GNP
levels for each region (Table 2) are from the Penn \Vorld Tables. Aggregate bilateral
merchandise trade flows for the year 1986 are derived from UNCTAD bilateral trade
2SThis characterization of the first-stage bargaining game thus abstracts from other potentially
important aspectsofbargaining in trade negotiations, such as the choice of the weights to be used
in the tariff setting rule for Customs Unions.
29Nash (1953). Notice that the Nash bargaining solution is not invariant with respect to trans-
formations of the players' utility functions. In the absence of any economic criterion to guide the
selection of a carduial representation of preferences, our choice of a linearly homogeneous specifica-
tion appears to be a natural one.









Source: Nguyen, Perroni andWigle(1993).
data, adjusted for consistency and discrepancies, and are summarized in Table 3.
Benchmark average ad valoreni combined tariff and non-tariff rates of protection
(also based on Nguyen, Perroni and Wigle (1993)) are summarized in Table 43O
4.2Trade elasticities
We base our model specification of import trade elasticities on the results of several
empirical studies, which are summarized in Table 5 (based on Marquez (1990)). As
we note above, trade elasticities and specifically import price elasticities, are crucial
30Ad valorem equivalent levels of protection by region are dicuJt to determine with precision.
The estimates we useinclude protectioneffects of domestic agricultural programmes. tectile quotas
and other VERs, and trade restrictivepracticesin services.





Mexico13.441 0.997 -1.6165.6720.487 5.971
Japan 70.748 5.5441.328 -38.8106.42789.113
E.C. 88.47713.9894.87925.8.56 -67.774236.090
OWE 13.492 2.1980.9014.62174.885 .41.997
ROW110.88211.3952.91861.925188.68219.895 -
Source: Nguyen, Perroni and Wigle (1993).
Table 4: Average Rates of Protection by Region,
against Imports from Other Regions (%)
Destination
Origin U.S.CanadaMexicoJapanE.C.O\VEROW
U.S. - 9.4 19.522.719.813.1 :35.5
Canada8.2 - 23.7 23.519.114.343.9
Mexico10.2 10.0 - 17.518.717.248.2
Japan 9.3 10.5 18.2 .18.310.342.4
E.C. 12.3 12.7 22.015.3 - 6.948.9
OWE11.4 12.7 20.8 13.110.1 ..56.8
ROW14.7 14.4 25.3 20.722.8 17.:3 .
Source: Nguyen. Perroni and Wigle (1993).
21Table 5: Import Elasticity Estimates
Comparison of Results from Seiected Studies
A B C D E F C
Uncompensated Own Price Elasticities
U.S. -0.54 .1.46 -1.66 -4.81-8.8 -0.20 -1.21-3.2 -0.63/.0.92
Canada -1.46 -0.61 -1.30 -1.2/-2.8 -0.460.1/-1.0-0.33/-1.02
Japan -0.72 -0.93 -0.78 -1.3/-7.7 -0.33 -0.7/-0.9 -0.28/-0,93
Germany -0.24 -1.00 -0.880.1/-1.9-0.30 0.51-1.3 -0.58/-0.60
U.K. 0.22n/a -0.650/-3.20.14-1.41-2.4 -0.471-0.49
Other OECD n/an/an/an/an/an/a -0.26/-O.49
LDCs n/an/an/an/an/an/a -0.34/-0.81
Income Elasticities
U.S. 1.51n/an/a 4.03 1.72 2.01 1.89/1.94
Canada. 1.20n/an/a 1.87 1.35 1.82 1.06/1.84
Japan 1.23n/an/a 1.69 1.17 0.41 0.35/0.48
Germany 1.80n/an/a 1.46 1.59 1.49 1.88/2.09
U.K. 1.66n/an/a 2.58 1.12 -1.10 2.09/2.51
Other OECD /a n/an/an/an/a n/a 2.02/2.03
LDCs n/a n/an/an/an/an/a 0.38,10.40
A: Houthakker and Magee (1969)
B: Adams and Junz (1971)
C: Stern. Francis and Schumacher (1976)
D: Wilson and Takacs (1979)
E: Thursby and Thursby (1984)
F: Warner and Xreinin (1983)
G: Marquez (1990)
22parameters in the determination of Nash tariffs. It is also the case that conclusive
evidence as to appropriate values remains elusive, with significant variation across
studies.
Income elasticity estimates are fairly consistent across studies; beginning with
Houthakker and Magee (1969) all studies find elasticity values in excess of units' for
all developed countries, with the notable exception of Japan. The estimates obtained
by Marquez for LDCs are also less than unity. In contrast, price elasticity estimates
vary widely across studies. Overall these studies seem to suggest high elasticity values
for the U.S., Japan and E.C. countries, and lower values for Canada and LDCs.
4.3 Calibration and model parameterization
Model parameters are calibrated to 1986 output. trade flows and protection data,
using the procedures described in Mansur and Whalley (1984). On the basis of our
survey of elasticity studies, supplemented by information on relative country size.
we adopt a central case configuration of price and income elasticities (Table 6). We
subsequently perform some sensitivity analysis around these b varying elasticities
values. inevitably limited by the number of potential combinations of elasticity con-
figurations.
The application of calibration methods to this model is straightforward. From
given bilateral trade flows and protection data, and from given import price and
income elasticities, we can infer parameter values for the elasticity of substitution
between imports and domestic production, a', subsistence levels DandA.'. and all
share parameters. For the second-tier Armington elasticities (the elasticities of substi-
tution among imports of different origin), in the absence of firm empirical estimates,
23Table 6: Central Case Specification
of Import Elasticities
Region Uncompensated Income








we use a value that is 50% higher that the upper-tier elasticities, i.e.. t11.5 0iV.,
reflecting the intuition that importables from different regions are seen as more sub-
stitutable than is the case between imports and domestic goods.3'
5 Simulation results
The model described in the previous section has been used tocompute a number
of counterfactual equilibria. These include Nash (post-retaliation)equilibria where
trade wars are unconstrained; cases where trade wars are constrainedby prior re-
gional agreements (member countries of a Free Trade Area or Customs Union donot
31Th,s intuition hasreceivedsome limited support in empirical studies. See Reinert and Shiells
(1993).
24retaliate against each other); cases where trade wars occur with differing regional
groupings; and, for the sake of comparison, cases where no trade wars occur, but
regional agreements are implemented. In all cases, as noted earlier, we make the
assumption that the ROW uses no retaliatory tariffs. This implies that retaliation is
limited to six regions in the model rather than the seven that are represented.
In Table 7, we report results for the case of a Nash tariff war which involves all
six (non-RO\V) regions treated as setting their external tariffs strategically, with no
prior regional agreement constraining retaliation. We use the central case elasticity
specification of the model and compute tariffs, trade, and other characteristics of the
post-retaliation Nash equilibrium.
As can be seen from the results, post-retaliation Nash tariffs are extremely high
and the more so the larger the country. This finding corresponds to the widespread
intuition that an all-out global trade war would be extremely destructive of trade,
and yield large shocks to individual economies. Thus. in the case of the E.C.. tariffs
in the range of 900 to 1000 percent are generated by the model, with rates around
500 percent in the case of the U.s. :32thedifference between these two reflecting
the relative importance of trade to GDP in these countries. Smaller estimatesare
obtained for Mexico and Canada which have less retaliatorypower than the E.C., the
U.S. and Japan. As we emphasize below, these high post-retaliation tariffsare also a
direct reflection of the elasticity values we use in our central case specification of the
Notice that in some cases,such hightariff rates amount effectively to prohibitive import bar-
riers,resulting inreductions in trade flows of almost 100 per cent, although with internationally
differentiated products in the model trade flows can never become zero.
25Table 7: Post-Retaliation Equilibrium
for the Central Case Elasticity Model Specificationa
A. Tariff Rates (%
Origin
Destination








123 132 228 931 167 38
514 131 226 935 167 44
480 118 223 923 168 48
430 118 131 897 16$ 42
426 118 131 220 179 49
435 118 131 220 890 57
481 117 131 235 1013 170
B. Changes in Trade Flows(%)
Destination








—81 —82 —87 —95 —;-7
—37 +1 +1 —27 —2 +33
—48 —21 —25 —46 —1.5 +9
—79 —.54 —56 —77 —52 —39
—98 —87 —89 —93 ——
—24 —12 —13 —21 —43 +18
+48 +3:3 +40 +3.5 +8 +29
C. Welfare Effects
Region




+52.5—100.2 —32.1—73.9 +128.4 —131.7 —1051.0 —1208.1
+1.2 —25.5 —8.5 —5.2+3.7—32.2 —10.6 —6.0
a The first six regions above are assumed to play strategically against all regions(including the
ROW). TheROWis treated as passive and its tariffs remain at benchmark levels throughout
the trade war (see text for details). Because imports from different regions are treated as im-
perfect substitutes in the model, each region has differential optimal tariffs across imports
from other regions.
26model, which, while literature-based, might nonetheless seem to many to be on the
low side. Associated impacts on trade flows in the Nash tariff equilibrium are also
presented in Table 7. with large reductions in particular bilateral trade linkages, such
as between Canada and the U.S., where high retaliatory tariffs occur in the larger
country;
Table 7 also reports the long-run equilibrium welfare effects implied by this form
of unconstrained trade war. These suggest that. large countries benefit substantially
from unconstrained retaliation, with the E.C. gaining nearly 130 biUion (3.7percent
of income in 1986), and the U.S. gaining over $50 billion (1.2 percent of income
in 1986). Large countries have more strategic leverage than small countries, and
small countries experience sharp reductions in bilateral trade flows with their largest
trading partners (Canada and Mexico with the U.S., and Other Western Europe with
the E.C.). Thus, smaller countries lose; and in the case of Canada and Other \Vestern
Europe these losses are large, in the region of 25 percent of national income. Losses
for Mexico are considerably smaller, reflecting the feature that, in our 1986 dataset,
international trade flows for Mexico are also smaller relative to GDP.
These results also underscore our proposition that it is a threat of global trade
wars during which small countries are excluded from access to large-country markets
which propels the smaller countries into regional trade negotiations with the larger
countries. In other words, the main objective of smaller countries in regional negoti-
The U.S.-Canada Nash tariffs computed by Markusen and Wigle (1989) are much smaller than
the ones here.Theirmodel, however, is calibrated to demand and supply elasticities and not directly
toliteratureestimates of tradeelasticities ashere.
27ations becomes insurance rather than improvements in access relative to the present
status quo.
In Table 8, we report welfare results for a variety of regional trade agreements
which constrain retaliation in a non-cooperative tariff game. In the second column
we report welfare effects of a trade war in the presence of a Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, in which Canadian and U.S. tariffs are constrained to remain bilaterally
at zero in a trade war. Large benefits accrue to Canada from this arrangement
because of both continued and ever more valuable preferential access to U.S. markets.
This is reflected in the sharply different results which are obtained relative toan
unconstrained trade war, shown in the first column of Table 8; gains to the U.S.are
converted to a loss, and the previous large loss to Canada is now converted toa small
gain. This small gain refleds not only continued access to the U.S. market, but the
added feature that this access is preferential. As barriers riseprogressively in the
U.S. markets against other suppliers from Japan, the E.C. and elsewhere, the value
of trade preferences to Canada becomes progressively larger. Gains to the E.C.are
higher in the event of a Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area tha.n in the unconstrained trade
war case, because a Free Trade Agreement constrains retaliation by the U.S..owing
to the significantly lowered tariff which Canada applies to third-country marketseven
in the event of a global trade war between Canada and the U.S.
This result is reversed if the U.S. and Canada form a Customs Unionrather than
a Free Trade Area, since their retaliatory power against the E.C. is now enhanced
(third column of Table 8). In the Customs Unioncase, bilateral tariffs are zero, as
in a Free Trade Area, but a common external tariff appliesagainst third countries.
A surprisingly large difference in results for the U.S. occurs with thischange. There
28Table 8: Welfare Effects in Nash Post-Retaliation
Trade War Equilibria in the Presence of
Alternative Retaliation Constraining Regional Trade Agreements
(Comparison to 1986 Benchmark)















































































































B. Hicksian EVs in % of NationalIncome







































































—5.2 —1.2 —5.4 I
+3.4 +1.1 +2.5
—33.5 +10.3 +10.1
—11.1 —4.6 —13.4 _ -1.9__
I'nronstruinedtrade warusvoI.ivsall regions clap.ROWadopting ui,tin,albilateraltariff,aajruLcad. andalltrathog prtrIrr, bin an FTA.tariffiare biloteraDv aero a.nonmember countries,and remain10throughout any retaliatory trade war
eIn s CU.tariff,are bilaterally so among member coimtnel. re.n.airung sothru.gbout anyretaliatory trade war,and a colotri,
external tariff issetamegcaIlyby the union against thirdcountries.Seetexi(ormore details.
d North America us U.S Canada. and Mexico; European implies E.C.plus Othcw Western Europe
29are significant benefits to the U.S. and reduced benefits to Canada. Positive benefits
for the U.S. reflect the feature that, with a common external tariff, the U.S. can now
induce Canada to follow a higher tariff along with the U.S. against third countries.
As a result, and as we indicate above, gains to the E.C. in a trade war are reduced.
Both these results, however, also dearly suggest that the bilateral trade agreement
between Canada and the U.S. would not occur were it not also accompanied by side
payments, since it would represent a losing proposition for the United States compared
to a full Nash equilibrium, while it would be a dramatically gaining proposition for
Canada. And hence the form of Canada-U.S. regional agreement that has emerged,
as essentially one-sided liberalization with side payments, as we argue above, becomes
more explicable with these results.
Table 8 also reports welfare effects of a trade war in the presence of a Mexico-U.S.
Free Trade Area or Customs Union, as well as a North American Free Trade Area
and Customs Union. In both cases where a bilateral arrangement is implemented,
Mexico benefits substantially from the arrangement; and, as in the Canada-U.S. case.
the U.S. is better off under a Customs Union arrangement than under a Free Trade
Agreement. In the absence of side payments, the U .S. is better off entering into
a Free Trade Area with Mexico than with a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
This finding is due to the fact that, in our 1986 data set, U.S.-Mexico trade flows are
sma.Uer than U.S.-Canada trade flows, implying that the retaliatory power of the U.S.
is less affected by a Free Trade arrangement with Mexico than by one with Canada.
North American trilateral arrangements have similar effects to those of the bilateral
Canadian and Mexican agreements, except that now the benefits of access are shared
by Canada and Mexico and benefits to the U.S. are lowered. Under a. trade war in the
30presence of a North American Free Trade Area, the U.S. loses rather than gains as
it would with a Customs Union. Also, the U.S. gains less with a three-way Customs
Union than it would in a two-way union with either Canada or Mexico.
Welfare effects of simultaneous bloc enlargements occurring in Europe and in
North America34 are reported in the final two columns of Table S. The gains to the
E.C. and the U.S. are significantly lower than in a full unconstrained trade war, the
more so with Free Trade Areas than with regional Customs Unions. The biggest
loser is the ROW bloc who loses even more than in the unconstrained case. Also
notice that. a trade war with the simultaneous formation of a North-American and
a European Customs Unions produces a larger negative aggregate welfare effect than
an unconstrained trade war.35
As we emphasize above, the high post-retaliation tariffs reported in Table 7, are.
in large part, a reflection of the elasticity values we use in our central case model
specification. While these are literature-based and values of this size are used by
other modellers, as we also comment above they would be considered in some circles
to be unrealistically low. In the upper panel of Table 9 we report recornputations of
post-retaliation Nash tariffs for cases where all trade elasticities are increased by 33
percent. In this case, post-retaliation optimal tariffs fall substantially: from nearly
34The European tradearrangementswe consider are more comprehensive than the current E.C.-
EFTA agreement, since the OWE bloc includes countries which do not belong to EFTA.
35As Kennan and Riezman (1990) have shown, the formation of a Customs Union in a strategic
tariff setting has ambiguous welfare effects. wbereas the formation of a Free Trade Area unambigu-
ously improves world welfare. More recently, Krugman (1991) and Haveman (1992) have described
examples where the formation of Customs Unions reduces world welfare.
31Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis of Post-Retaliation Equilibrium Tariff Rates()












66 69 94144 83 38
140 68 93147 84 44
135 65 92147 84 48
123 64 68 144 84 42
120 64 68 91 86 49
122 64 68 91 153 57












126 146 222409 138 38
363 147 227414 139 44
360 128 227414 140 48
338 128 147 412 139 42
350 128 147 2'26 138 49
356 128 147228407 57
367 128 147 229428 140
a ji)refersto the elasticity of substitution between import types (by
region of origin). crrefersto the elasticity of substitution between
the domestic good and the import composite. In the central case)
we assume ji)= 1.5a.
321000 percent to around 150 percent for the E.C.
In the lower panel of the same table we report equilibrium tariffs fora parameter-
ization involving the same higher import price elasticities, but where thesecond-tier
Arrnington substitution elasticities are assumed to be equal to the elasticity of substi-
tution between domestically produced goods and the importaggregate. These rates
are bigher than those in the upper panel (around 400 percent for the E.C.) but still
considerably lower than those found in our central-case calculations. These results
underscore the point that, given present literature and uncertaintiesas to model
elasticity values, all the estimates of characteristics of Nash equilibriawe report in
our paper have to be taken as indicative of ranges rather than as providing precise
estimates.
In Table 10, we report welfare effects of alternative regionalarrangements in the
absence of any strategic tariff setting. Generally speaking. the effectsare small relative
to the trade war effects shown in Table S. In most cases, all participants in theregional
arrangements benefit, the more so with Customs Unions than with Free Trade Areas.
In the few cases where regional participants lose, such as the 1J.S. ina Free Trade
Area with Canada, and the U.S. and E.C. with the simultaneous formation of North
American and European Free Trade Areas. this is a reflection of elasticityparameters
and asymmetrical initial protection levels. The small size of the welfare effects from
these regional agreements serves to emphasize the main theme ofour paper, namely
the dominance of the insurance objectives of theseagreements over conventional trade
liberalization.
We have been able to elaborate on the results from Tables S and 10 for the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area and Customs Union cases, by explicit]-calculating side
33Table 10: Welfare Effectsol Alternative
Regional Arrangemcnts
No Retaliation EquILibria
(1rnpct of Liberalization Relative to 19S6 Benchmark)




































































































































































































































' AUtrad.barrier. ure remoed.
b au FTA, tariffi are bilaterally zero auioojmeuxbtrcountrxea.
C In a CU. units are bilaterally zero amonj ne.obcr countnes, retuanixig so (hrou5boui any retaliatory trade a:, and a conrnon
externaltarUf appliessoimportsfromthlrd countries.See text ror oso.e detaji,.
d NorthA,nenca ix U.S..Can.d. aridMexico; Europeaniaaptkx E.C. phx Other Weiero Europe.
34payments which would support a Pareto improvement for U.S. and Canada relative
to an unconstrained scenario. For a given assumed configuration of values for the
subjective probability of a trade war occurring and for the coefcient of relative risk
aversion as discussed in the previous section, we use a series of calculations to traceout
the bargaining sets for Free Trade and Customs Unionagreements between Canada
and the U.S. by varying transfers between members. These setsare shown in Figure
1. Point D. the "disagreement point", depicts the expected payoffs to the U.S. and
Canada in the absence of an agreement, while the expected payoffs froman agreement
with no side payments are represented by point A. For both a Free Trade Areaand
a Customs Union, in the absence of side payments the expected payoff to the U.S. is
below its reservation expected utility. Parametrically varying inter-countrytransfers
then allows us to trace the bargaining set for the agreement. i.e.. theset of points
which are Pareto superior to the disagreement point. The Nashbargaining outcome
is shown as point Q.Aswe noted above, in the absence of side pavment.s (point A).
the U.S. is better off in a Customs Union than in a Free Trade Area. whereasCanada
is almost indifferent between the two. For Canada. this implies lowerequilibrium side
payments and a higher expected payoff (point Q)inthe Customs Union case than in
the Free Trade Area case.
We have also computed the side payments associated witha Nash bargaining
outcome for different values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and various
subjective probabilities values of trade wars occurring (assuming theseparameters to
be identical across countries). These are reported in Table11; and suggest that for a
Canada.[.S. Free Trade Area side payments could be as high as SO billion. The side
payments to a Customs Union agreement are smaller than in the Free Trade Area
35A. Free Trade Area
1.1EUt15
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0.5 O9 095 1.0i]s E(
B: 1986 benchmark (no retaliation)
D: unconstrained trade war
A: trade agreement with no side payments
Q:Na.shbargaining solution
= 0.5 (irçy: subjective probability of a trade war occurring)
=pUS1.0 (p: coefficient of relative risk aversion)
Figure 1: Bargaining Sets for Alternative Canada-U.S. Trade Arrangements
36Table 11: Equilibrium Side Payments from Canada to the U.S.(U.S.$B)
Central Case Elasticity Model Specification










15.9 16.8 22.7 29.6
28.9 30.0 35.2 39.2














33.5 34.3 37.0 38.5
42.5 42.6 42.7 42.7
p: coecient of relative risk aversion
lrw: subjective probability of a trade war occurring
37case, as would be expected from the results in Table 8, with this difference increasing
in the probability of a trade war. Estimating the actual side payments implied by the
1988 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (and its accompanying process), of course,
difficult. but with stronger patent protection, pricing restraints implied by the energy
provisions, and other features, implicit side payments in the range of $15 billion per
year by Canada to the U.S. may not be an unreasonable estimate.36
Finally, in Table 12, we look at the issue of sequential bloc formation, evaluating
the desirability or otherwise of first negotiating with a large country, or allowing
others to negotiate and then joining the agreement later.37 For the Customs Union
case, we find that there are substantial gains for both Canada and Mexico from being
first in entering into an agreement with the U.S. This is because the exclusion from
the initial regional grouping increases the bargaining power of the larger group, and
thus makes it more costly to enter later. For the Free Trade Area case, there are be
36This is basedonconjectures circulating at the time of the agreement that firmer intellectual
property protectionin Canada for U.S. firms mightbe worth around$5 billion a year. We add
to thisthevalue of the guarantee of no differential domestic and export pricinsforsates of energy
from U.S. company owned leases. Lenjosek and Whaltey (1986) report estimates of he rent losses
toCanadafrom eliminating differential energy pricingwhichrangefrom $2.5tolObillionU.S.
(using1980data).Further smaller concessions were made by Canada inthe investment screening
and securityofenergysupplyareas.Thus, an overallfigureof around$15 billionayear asnon-trade
benefits totheU.S. could be plausible.
37We first compute the Nash bargaining solution for the first-stage bilateralarrangement(we
assumemyopic behaviourinthe first-stagebargaining game)andthen use this outcome todefine
thedisagreement point for the second-stage trilateral bargaining game.
38Table 12: Expected Payoffs from Sequential Bloc Formation






















p: coefficient of relative risk aversion
subjectiveprobability of a trade war occurring
.39nefits to Canadafromfollowing Mexico in the arrangement. This is because. as the
results in Table S show, the first entry of Canada into a Free Trade Area with the U.S.
would entail a substantial loss for the U.S.; the side payment requested by the U.S.
fora first entry by Canada would be accordingly large. By delaying entry. Canada
can thus lower the cost of its admission into a North American Free Trade Area.
This result is opposite to that which is now frequently ascribed to NAFTA, ashaving
detrimental effects on sequential entrants because of their limited ability to obtain
new benefits since their entry merely reapportions gains which have already accrued
to other trading partners. The opposite result for Mexico in this case is a reflection
of the relative sizes of Canada and Mexico, and of the consequent reduced impact of
a Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement on the retaliatory power of the U.S.
In both the Free Trade Area and Customs Union cases, the U.S. is better off
by negotiating sequentially with its smaller partners than by engaging in multilateral
trade negotiations. This latter result thus serves to emphasize the theme of this paper:
namely that viewing regional agreements as insurance rather than more conventional
trade liberalization seems to accord with the observed patterns of the new regionalism:
that large countries can extract significant benefits from such agreements because of
the risk of global trade wars. The dynamic instability of a regime in which large
countries turn away from multilateralism, raising the risk of trade wars, inaeasing
the size of the side payments they can extract, and further raising the incentives for
a weakened commitment to multiilateralism is what haunts the multilateralists in the
trade policy community. Its analytical underpinnings are borne out in our results.
406 Concluding remarks
This paper suggests that recent regional arrangements. which are both complex and
seemingly of little trade-liberalizing substance, are as much if not more insurance
arrangements than reciprocity-based trade treaties. Firmer assurances of access to
large markets are given to smaller countries in return for side payments or premia
(restraints on domestic policies, firmer inteUectual property protection, and other
concessions).
We use numerical simulation methods to explore how different countries value
their participation in regional trade arrangements under the threat of a global trade
war. We calibrate the model to literature-based elasticities and share parameters on
the basis of 1986 bilateral trade flow data., and compute post-retaliation Nash tariff
equilibria, under alternative regional arrangements. These include Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreements and Customs Unions. similar Mexico-U.S. and North American
arrangements, as well as enlargements of the E.C.
Our results suggest that for the U.S. it does not pay to negotiate a regional
agreement with Canada if no side payments are allowed. This is because, while there
ma' be more leverage in a tariff war with the E.C. or the Rest-of'the-\Vorld (at
least in the Customs nion case). losing the opportunity to play strategically against
Canada more than offsets the source of gain. Since Canada benefits substantially
from preferential duty-free access to U.S. markets in a bloc-wide rather than coantry-
wide trade var, the side payment that the U.S. can demand of Canada more than
compensates in a trade war with side payments allowed within blocs. The U.S. is thus
better off participating in a bloc than not and, if side payments occur, both large and
small countries will see it as in their interest to form blocs because of the insurance
41and side.payment elements involved.
Similar themes emerge for other arrangements. although with nuances. The U.S.
is better off in a regional arrangement with Mexico with side payments than not.
and similarly the E.C. with Other Western European countries. Customs Unions
seem preferred by all members over a Free Trade Area since their joint retaliatory
power is increased; but the side payments which can be extracted are typically lower.
We use a Nash bargaining solution concept to compute the side payments associated
with different trade arrangements, and conjecture that the ranges involved in the
Canada-U.S. case may not fall too far short of the implicit side payments in the 1988
Canada-U.S. Agreement.
The theme that emerges is that recent regional trade agreements are more readily
understandable as insurance arrangements with premia than as conventional trade
liberalization treaties; especially so since it is the smaller countries who have sought
them. But their value to large countries rises as the risk of global trade conflicts rises.
since they can extract increasingly larger premia. The threat they present to the
trading system thus becomes more apparent when viewed in this Eight than a more
conventional assessment might reveal.
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